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Abstract 
 
Fraud is an ancient crime and one that annually causes hundreds of 
billions of dollars in losses. We examine the behavioral patterns over 
time of different types of frauds, which illustrate cyclical frequencies. 
We develop an evolutionary theory that suggests cyclic behavior in 
frauds should be common. 
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1. Introduction 
Fraud is as old as civilization itself.1 Aristotle recounts a story of financial fraud in 
sixth century BC Greece.2 Minor Greek sculptors carved the signatures of Phidias 
and Praxiteles into their works prepared for export to Roman collectors.3 Fraud 
begets anti-fraud: “forensic accounting is one of the oldest professions and dates back 
to the Egyptians. The ‘eyes and ears’ of the king was a person who basically served as 
a forensic accountant for Pharaoh, watchful over inventories of grain, gold, and other 
assets.”4  Modern frauds include Ponzi and pyramid schemes, securities frauds, 
corporate accounting financial scandals, medical and automobile insurance frauds, 
sophisticated art forgeries, the shell game, and the “Nigerian scam,” to name just a 
few. 
Fraud is very big business. According to the FBI, fraudulent billings are 
estimated to be between three and ten percent of total health care expenditures5 or 
approximately $70–$230 billion annually.6 The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 
estimates that insurance fraud costs Americans approximately $80 billion a year.7 The 
                                                              
1 The exact definition of fraud varies across different professions. In accounting, for example, fraud 
means misrepresentation of fact, while misappropriation of assets is termed defalcation. See, e.g., 
Matsumura and Tucker (1992). Here we use the word “fraud” in a broader sense to include all acts 
intended to swindle their victims. 
2 Aristotle, “Constitution of Athens,” The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, Princeton University 
Press (1984), pp. 2341-2383. (“As soon as he was at the head of affairs, Solon liberated the people once 
and for all, by prohibiting all loans on the security of the debtor’s person; and in addition he made laws 
and cancelled all debts, public and private. This measure is commonly called the Seisachtheia [removal 
of burdens] since thereby the people had their loads removed from them. In connexion with it some 
persons try to traduce the character of Solon. It so happened that, when he was about to enact the 
Seisachtheia, he communicated his intention to some members of the upper class, whereupon, as the 
partisans of the popular party say, his friends stole a march on him; while those who wish to attack his 
character maintain that he too had a share in the fraud himself. For these persons borrowed money and 
bought up a large amount of land, and so when, a short time afterwards, all debts were cancelled, they 
became wealthy; and this, they say, was the origin of the families which were afterwards looked on as 
having been wealthy from primeval times.”) Id. at pp. 2343-44. 
3 http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/forg-art. 
4 Singleton, T. and Singleton, A. (2010), Fraud Accounting and Forensic Accounting, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 4th ed., p. 3. 
5 “Financial Crimes Report to the Public, Fiscal Year 2009,” FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2009/financial_crime_2009.htm. 
6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf, reporting 2008 calendar year 
total national health expenditures, private and public. 
7 http://www.insurancefraud.org/fraud_backgrounder.htm. Insurance fraud has been estimated to 
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recent unraveling of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, reportedly the largest in history, 
caused approximately $20 billion in losses among its thousand-plus investors.8 
Corporate financial scandals based on fraudulent accounting practices have caused 
even more economic mayhem. The collapse of Enron in the fall of 2001 cost investors 
and employees over $70 billion in lost capitalization and retirement benefits.9 
Forensic accountants specializing in fraud detection and deterrence find that 
the frequency of fraud is a cyclical phenomenon.10 New frauds lead to new or 
modified anti-fraud measures, which lead to innovations in fraudulent activities, 
which lead to updated antifraud measures, and so on. A leading fraud accounting 
textbook explains how following the “explosion of fraud around the last half of the 
1990s and the early 2000s . . . the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act due 
to [the Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate accounting financial frauds.] More 
recently, the housing and real estate boom of the 2000s has led to increased fraud 
particularly in the area of mortgage fraud. . . . Various pieces of legislation have been 
passed in response, continuing the cycle of evolving frauds and attempts to control 
them. . . . . The fraud environment can be and often is viewed as a pendulum, 
swinging from one extreme to the other with little time in between at the proper 
balancing point. This cycle (pendulum swing) is a natural result of human nature, 
business cycles, and the nature of legislation and regulation. The cycle can certainly 
be influenced and controlled to some extent, but it will probably never cease.”11 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
increase annual household insurance premiums by $300, of which increased automobile insurance 
premiums account for $180. See Arizona Insurance Council, “Insurance Fraud,” available at 
http://www.azinsurance.org/fraud.html. 
8 Henriques, D., “Deal Recovers $7.2 Billion for Madoff Fraud Victims,” New York Times, Dec. 17, 
2010. 
9 The Handbook of Texas Online, “Enron Corporation,” 
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/EE/doe8.html. 
10 Cyclic behavior of prices and outputs has been observed in other economic markets, e.g., the 
canonical hog cycle. See, e.g., Shonkwiler and Spreen (1986). Agricultural cycles are distinct because 
they have a natural lag created by production processes; such processes are not part of our analysis. 
11 Singleton, T. and Singleton, A. (2010), Fraud Accounting and Forensic Accounting, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 4th ed., pp. 5-7. See also Simic (2005). (“There are three stages in the [credit card fraud] 
cycle. Stage 1 represents familiarity with weaknesses in cards and technology which drives up the 
value of fraud. Fraud begins to rise as new technologies and new weaknesses are found. Stage 2 
represents new solutions implemented to reduce fraud. The solutions are not implemented immediately, 
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Textbook accounts have some empirical support. FBI data on the annual 
number of individuals arrested for fraud are shown in Figure 1. The data show a 
substantial increase in the number of individuals arrested for fraud in the 1990s. The 
total number of arrests declines in the 2000s, with the notable exception of two 
increases in 2002 and 2005. For purposes of comparison, we select two other types of 
crime (burglary and vandalism) that have roughly the same annual number of arrests, 
but that do not appear to have feedback mechanisms like that for fraud. (That is, new 
types of burglary or vandalism do not appear to be developed, leading to new 
anti-burglary or anti-vandalism measures, and so on.) The data show that in 1974, the 
number of arrests for fraud was lower than the number of arrests for burglary and 
vandalism. By 1977, the number of arrests for fraud surpassed the number of arrests 
for vandalism, and by 1994, fraud had the most number of arrests, which lasted until 
2006, at which time fraud had the fewest number of arrests. We can measure changes 
over time in the rankings for total arrests for these three types of crime using the 
Spearman rank correlation. The rank correlation between burglary and vandalism 
equals 0.16, but the rank correlations between fraud and burglary or vandalism equal 
-0.89 and -0.58, respectively. Thus, the number of arrests for fraud changes over time 
in ways that are uncorrelated with the number of arrests for burglary and vandalism. 
To be clear, we do not contend that the frequency of fraud is completely 
independent of general trends in the frequency of crime. Indeed, the trends for fraud, 
burglary, and vandalism in Figure 1 illustrate the general decline in crime in the U.S. 
since the mid-1990s. However, the large swings in the number of arrests of fraud over 
periods as short as a year or two, relative to changes in the number of arrests for 
burglary and vandalism, are consistent with the conclusion of Singleton and Singleton 
(2010) that fraud is a cyclical phenomenon. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and therefore Stage 3 represents time lag for solutions to take effect.”) Id., p. 4. See also Reinstein and 
Bayou (1998). (“Fraudsters use many clever schemes to misappropriate company assets and misstate 
financial statements. Analyzing fraud as a mere historical event can provide an inadequate basis to 
detect (or prevent) fraud, given its multidimensional, cyclical, and dynamic nature.”) Id., p. 20. 
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Figure 1: Total Arrests: 1974-2008 
Fraud, Burglary, and Vandalism 
 
Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data, Master Files, Arrests Monthly, 1974-2008. 
 
One potential drawback to the FBI data in Figure 1 is that the data are 
aggregated for all types of fraud. However, a new type of bankruptcy fraud, for 
example, that leads to a new anti-fraud measure designed to deter bankruptcy fraud 
may have little effect on the frequency of insurance fraud. Data on the frequency of 
specific types of fraud are not publicly available. Therefore, we estimate the 
frequency of a specific type of fraud by the number of articles in major news sources 
discussing that type of fraud. 
We use the LexisNexis news database for this purpose, which allows us to 
conduct full-text keyword searches of all archived articles from major news sources. 
We assume that the frequency of articles on a given type of fraud reflects the 
underlying level of that type of fraudulent activity. Thus, we assume crimes and news 
about crimes are correlated and the latter may be used as a proxy to measure the 
former. This methodology is used by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who note that it has 
a long history of use in sociology, e.g., Danzger (1975), Inverarity (1976), and Olzak 
(1989). 
We test the methodology by regressing the number of articles published in a 
local newspaper that contain the relevant keyword for a specific type of crime, e.g., 
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“burglary,” on the actual number of incidents of that type of crime. In particular, we 
use monthly crime data from 1991 through 2008 for aggravated assault, simple assault, 
burglary, and larceny as reported in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program for the city of Houston, Texas.12 We then determine the number 
of articles per month containing the relevant keywords using LexisNexis to search 
through the archives of the Houston Chronicle. The estimated regressions show 
statistically significant results for each of the four types of crime.13 These results 
provide some empirical support for our assumption that the number of articles 
discussing a given type of fraud serves as a proxy for the actual number of incidents 
of that type of fraud. 
Figure 2 shows the number of articles per month containing the keywords 
“bankruptcy fraud,” as well as the simple six-month moving average of that series.14 
The results indicate that the frequency of occurrences is not monotonical. Instead 
significant peaks and troughs are visible. The frequency of occurrences is not 
significantly correlated with recessions in the U.S. economy. The evidence presented 
here and in section II indicates that some types of fraud display cyclical patterns. 
  
                                                              
12 U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Houston, TX, 1991-2008. 
13 The correlations between the monthly number of newspaper articles and crimes are as follows: 
aggravated assault, 0.14; simple assault, 0.46; burglary, 0.17; and larceny, 0.52. The regression and 
correlation results are available at www.mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/Fraudcycles/. 
14 For each of the different types of fraud analyzed here, we searched LexisNexis using the criterion 
that the word “fraud” had to be within one word of the word indicating the type of fraud. For example, 
in the search for “bankruptcy fraud,” the word “fraud” had to be either next to or within one word of 
the word “bankruptcy.” The news sources used in Figure 2 are American Banker, Associated Press, 
Business Wire, Facts on File World News Digest, Journal of Commerce, New York Times, PR 
Newswire, United Press International, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. We also used an 
expanded list of news sources, consisting of all sources in the LexisNexis category “U.S. Newspapers 
and Wires.” In 2010, that database contained 691 news sources. The results, which are available at 
www.mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/Fraudcycles/Graphs.pdf, are similar in terms of indicating the presence of 
cycles for different types of frauds. The expanded list of news sources results in upward trends in the 
frequency of articles on different types of frauds, caused by duplicate articles discussing the same 
frauds as reported in our more restricted list of news sources. 
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Figure 2: Frequency of “Bankruptcy Fraud” in Selected U.S. Newspapers and Wires 
 
Source: LexisNexis. 
Why do frauds come and go? One possible answer is the public’s short 
memory. The earliest theoretical study of fraud-related phenomenon is Lui (1986), 
who developed a model of corruption deterrence in an overlapping generation 
structure. Lui assumes that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy, 
effectively auditing a corrupt official becomes more difficult. This reinforcement 
leads to variations in government’s effectiveness to deter corruption, resulting in 
cyclical patterns of fraud over time. A related topic, the intertemporal variation in 
business ethics, was studied by Noe and Rebello (1994). They modeled the dynamic 
interaction between business ethics and economic activities, generating cycling of 
ethics behavior. Another approach correlates certain types of frauds with the business 
cycle. For example, corporate financial misrepresentation can be concealed by a boom 
that an ensuing bust reveals. Povel et al. (2005) developed a theoretical model with 
financial misrepresentation cycles based on investors’ vigilance level fluctuating with 
the boom and bust cycle of the economy. All of this work is consistent with the 
general model we develop. Our approach emphasizes cyclicality created 
endogenously, rather than driven off an external cycle, but our approach is consistent 
with such external influences. 
Our model is most closely related to that of Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004). 
They used replicator dynamics and developed a model that predicts fraud cycles; their 
model is approximately a linear version of a special case of our theory (see Section 3). 
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Separately, Sutter (2003) provided a theoretical model to study election fraud, where 
he showed the relevance of both demand and cost factors in the elimination of corrupt 
election practices. Hyman (2001) analyzed the complexity of relevant parties’ 
differing interests in health care fraud. As a follow-up commentary on Hyman (2001), 
Feldman (2001) argued that the root cause of fraud in medical programs is distorted 
higher prices coupled with agents’ efficiency-seeking activities under price distortion. 
There is also a sizable literature in accounting regarding the detection of fraud 
through audits, including Matsumura and Tucker (1992), Morton (1993), Hansen et al. 
(1996), and Bonner et al. (1998). 
One shortcoming of the prior literature is the focus on the supply side of 
frauds, without endogenizing behavior of the demand side (victims) over time. In our 
approach, we assume a certain percentage of businesses are fraudulent while the rest 
are legitimate, and a certain percentage of buyers on the demand side are vigilant 
while the rest are not. The interaction of these two forces over time leads to multiple 
steady states in equilibrium. The reason for multiple steady states is similar to that 
found in Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996). Our main result concerns the 
convergence to a steady state. We show that cyclic behavior—specifically a spiral—is 
a robust feature of a large class of evolutionary adaptation models. 
The intuition for cyclic behavior is that it constitutes a feedback loop, 
mediated by evolution. When fraud is prevalent, vigilance pays. Increased vigilance 
reduces the return to fraud, thereby decreasing fraud. The reduction in fraud reduces 
the return to vigilance, thereby increasing fraud. We make two contributions. First, we 
empirically examine this cyclic outcome for a variety of frauds. Second, we show that 
the predicted outcome (i.e., that the frequency of a given type of fraud will be cyclical) 
is theoretically robust, and moreover we identify cycles based on the relative response 
or reaction rates of the two parties—scammers and victims. Interestingly, extremely 
fast responses by either side tend to eliminate cycles. Moderate adjustment speeds by 
both sides is necessary, and with a payoff condition sufficient, for cyclic behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background information 
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and data on fraudulent behavior are described in Section 2. We use product quality as 
an example to illustrate a model in Section 3 that generates cyclical behavior. We then 
extend the example to a general, two-variable model in Section 4 and derive the main 
result of the paper that characterizes the conditions for cyclicality of fraud 
occurrences. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5. All technical proofs are 
presented in the Appendix. 
2. Background and Data on Types of Fraud at a Nationwide Level 
Useful statistics on fraud at a nationwide level are published by the United Kingdom’s 
National Fraud Authority (“NFA”).15 In its most recent report, the NFA estimates 
total fraud in the UK in 2008 at £30.5 billion16 or approximately 2.1 percent of the 
country’s 2008 Gross Domestic Product.17 Figure 3 shows a detailed breakdown of 
the types of frauds occurring in the UK. The largest category is tax fraud, at £15.2 
billion or approximately half of all fraud. Public sector fraud accounts for 
approximately 58 percent of all fraud in the UK, with the private and 
individual/charity sectors accounting for approximately 30 percent and 12 percent, 
respectively. 
 
  
                                                              
15 See http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/departments/pages/nfsa.aspx. 
16 See http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/nfa/GuidetoInformation/Documents/ 
NFA_fraud_indicator.pdf. 
17 http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-kingdom. British pounds in 2008 are converted to dollars 
according to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, “Yearly Average Exchange Rates,” available at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=206089,00.html. 
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Figure 3: Types of Frauds in the UK (2008) 
 
Source: National Fraud Authority (January 2010), “Annual Fraud Indicator,” p. 7, available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/nfa/GuidetoInformation/Documents/NFA_fraud_indicator.pdf. 
Fraud is a worldwide crime. In 2009, the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (“ACFE”) conducted a survey of its approximately 23,000 members and 
obtained detailed statistics on 1,843 occupational frauds occurring in 106 nations.18 
Table 1 summarizes some of the key findings from the study. A strong inverse 
relationship exists between the median loss for a given type of fraud and the median 
duration of that type of fraud. For example, the least costly type of asset misallocation 
was register disbursement, with a median loss of $23,000 and a median duration of 12 
months, while the most costly type of asset misallocation was check tampering, with a 
median loss of $131,000 and a median duration of 24 months. The most costly type of 
fraud in the survey was financial statement fraud, with a median loss of $4.1 million 
and a median duration of 27 months. 
 
                                                              
18 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2010), “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse,” available at http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf. The ACFE defines “occupational fraud,” 
which may occur in public or private organizations, as follows: “The use of one’s occupation for 
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s 
resources or assets.” Id. at p. 6. 
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Table 1: International Statistics on Occupational Frauds 
Type of Fraud Percentage of all 
Frauds/1 
Median Loss 
($) 
Median Duration 
(Number of Months) 
Asset Misallocation/2 89 135,000 12-24/5 
Corruption/3 33 250,000 18 
Financial Statement/4 5 4,100,000 27 
Source: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2010), “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse,” available at 
http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf. /1Percentages sum to more than 100 percent because several fraudulent schemes involved 
more than one type. /2“Asset misallocation” is the theft or misuse of an organization’s resources, e.g., skimming cash receipts, 
falsifying expense reports, or forging company checks. /3“Corruption” is an employee’s effort to influence business transactions in 
a way that violates the employee’s duty to the employer for the purpose of benefitting the employee or someone else, e.g., bribery, 
extortion, or conflict of interest. /4“Financial statement” fraud is the intentional misstatement or omission of material information in 
the organization’s financial records, e.g., fictitious revenues, concealing expenses or liabilities, or artificially inflating reported 
assets. /5The duration of the asset misallocation depended on the type of fraud. 
The ACFE survey asked its members to estimate the percentage of annual 
revenue that a typical organization loses to fraud. The median response was five 
percent, which implies annual global losses of hundreds of billions of dollars. This is 
consistent with the NFA’s estimate that fraud accounts for 2.1 percent of the UK’s 
GDP. Applied globally, this implies an annual cost of fraud of approximately $1.3 
trillion dollars. 
In efforts to develop better methods to deter fraud, investigators have 
documented how frauds are detected. The AFCE survey reported that the most 
common form of detection was tips, which accounted for approximately 40 percent of 
all cases (see Figure 4). This finding was consistent with four prior studies conducted 
by the AFCE in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Approximately 50 percent of all tips 
came from employees, while 34 percent came from sources outside of the 
organization, e.g., customers and vendors. Management review and internal audits 
were the next most common forms of fraud detection. 
Given the level of fraud, public agencies and private firms have taken actions 
to deter fraud. As summarized by ACFE: “In response to the discovery of fraud, more 
than 80% of the victim organizations in our study implemented or modified internal 
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controls.” For those approximately 80 percent of organizations that did change their 
internal controls in response to fraud, Figure 5 shows the actions they took. The most 
common response was to increase employees’ segregation of duties, using the “need 
to know” principle. Increased management review and surprise audits were the next 
most commonly imposed changes in internal controls. 
 
Figure 4: Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds
 
Source: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2010), “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse,” p. 16, available at http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf. 
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Figure 5: Internal Controls Implemented or Modified in Response to Fraud
 
Source: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2010), “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse,” p. 47, available at http://butest.acfe.com/rttn/rttn-2010.pdf. The percentages sum to more 
than 100 percent because many organizations implemented or modified more than one type of anti-fraud 
control. 
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innovations in types of frauds, which leads to more changes in anti-fraud measures, 
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Public Accountant] profession instituted an auditing rule that required 
auditors to physically test for the existence of warehouses and inventory 
stocks within warehouses. 
Each new corporate ploy to get around accounting and auditing 
rules eventually results in corrective accounting and auditing rules, 
which of course is why the exponentially growing set of such rules is 
becoming almost incomprehensible. The same thing happens with 
consumer and investor protection laws. When fraud finally gets so out 
of hand and has intense media exposure, U.S. democracy generally 
works. Corrective laws are eventually passed, and criminals are forced 
to seek newer and more innovative frauds.19 
 
In order to obtain more insight into the frequency of fraud and the role of 
media exposure, we use the LexisNexis database to conduct full-text searches to 
determine the frequency of articles on different types of fraud. Here we report the 
frequency of articles containing the keywords: “bank fraud,” “wire fraud,” “mail 
fraud,” and “insurance fraud” (see Figures 6-9).20 
 
  
                                                              
19 Jensen, Robert, “History of Fraud in America,” available at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudAmericanHistory.htm. 
20 See footnote 14 for sources and comments. Graphs illustrating the frequency of articles on other 
types of frauds are available at www.mcafee.cc/Papers/PDF/Fraudcycles/Graphs.pdf. 
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Figure 6: Frequency of “Bank Fraud” in U.S. Newspapers and Wires 
 
Source: LexisNexis. 
Figure 7: Frequency of “Wire Fraud” in U.S. Newspapers and Wires 
 
Source: LexisNexis. 
 
Figure 8: Frequency of “Mail Fraud” in U.S. Newspapers and Wires 
 
Source: LexisNexis. 
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Figure 9: Frequency of “Insurance Fraud” in U.S. Newspapers and Wires 
 
Source: LexisNexis. 
 
The graphs illustrate that the frequency of different types of fraud have 
substantial local peaks and troughs. Moreover the monthly frequencies of the different 
types of frauds are uncorrelated with each other21 and with the business cycle. In sum, 
the data indicate that the frequencies of different types of frauds are cyclical. 
3. A Product Quality Model 
In this section, we provide an example where fraudulent behavior displays cyclical 
patterns. Suppose sellers in a market offer products of either high or low quality, and y 
is the fraction of sellers with high quality. All of these products are sold as high 
quality. Buyers can verify the quality by incurring a verification cost c, and x is the 
fraction of verifiers. We assume that verifiers never buy the low-quality product. We 
let v be the net utility of the high-quality product; the net utility of the low-quality 
product equals zero. 
A verifier who encounters a high-quality product, which occurs with 
probability y, buys, while a verifier who encounters a low-quality product does not 
buy but instead searches again, discounting utility due to delay by a rate ߜ. This 
means the verifier obtains a utility in satisfying ݑ ൌ ݕݒ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݕሻߜݑ െ ܿ . The 
non-verifier obtains utility ݕݒ. 
                                                              
21 For the ten correlations on the five types of fraud, the correlations in the monthly number of articles 
range from -0.27 to 0.41. 
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We focus on verification and so rule out signaling, introductory prices, 
reputation, and other solutions given in the literature. These solutions are to some 
extent consistent with the model. For example, verification could entail checking a 
firm’s reputation. The buyer’s utility is: 
ݑ ൌ ൜
ݕݒ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݕሻߜݑ െ ܿ ݂݅ ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ
ݕݒ ݂݅ ݊݋ݐ             
which simplifies to: 
ݑ ൌ ቊ
௬௩ି௖
ଵିఋሺଵି௬ሻ
݂݅ ݒ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ
ݕݒ ݂݅ ݊݋ݐ
             (3.1) 
The net utility gain to verification for a consumer equals: 
௬௩ି௖
ଵିఋሺଵି௬ሻ
െ ݕݒ ൌ ఋ௬
ሺଵି௬ሻ௩ି௖
ଵିఋሺଵି௬ሻ
             (3.2) 
The existence of at least two equilibria is apparent from (3.2), because there 
are typically two levels of y in which the consumer is indifferent between verifying 
and not. In Figure 10, we graph the net utility of verifying as a function of the 
proportion of high-quality firms. This utility is zero at both  ݕ ൌ 0 and ݕ ൌ 1 , 
because there is nothing to learn. Thus, if there is a level of y in which the value of 
verifying exceeds the cost, there will usually be two such levels. Call them L and M. 
Below L and above M verification does not pay, so the fraction of verifiers will tend 
to fall. 
 
Figure 10: Net Benefits to Vigilance 
 
 c
L 1 M y
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The values of L and M can be derived by letting the numerator of (3.2), 
ߜݕሺ1 െ ݕሻݒ െ ܿ , equal zero, which yields two solutions, ଵ
ଶ
ቆ1 േ ට1 െ ସ௖
ఋ௩
ቇ. This 
means L and M are on the opposite sides of ½, assuming ௖
௩
൏ ଵ
ସ
ߜ to guarantee 
non-overlapping real values for L and M. We maintain this assumption throughout the 
section. 
A company that makes the high-quality product earns a per unit profit denoted 
ߨ௚ and any buyer who shops with that seller purchases the high-quality product. 
Low-quality companies sell only to non-verifiers, but capture a share λ of the gain in 
value v of the high-quality product, in addition to the normal per unit profit ߨ௚. 
Verifiers stay in the market longer than non-verifiers, as there are on average 
1/ݕ searches per verifier, but just one search per non-verifier. Thus, the proportion of 
non-verifiers per search is ଵି௫
ଵି௫ା௫/௬
. The profit of low-quality companies is 
ଵି௫
ଵି௫ା௫/௬
൫ߨ௚ ൅ λݒ൯, and the profit of high-quality companies is ߨ௚. The net gain to 
being a high-quality company, per arriving searcher, is then 
ߨ௚ െ
ଵି௫
ଵି௫ା௫/௬
൫ߨ௚ ൅ λݒ൯ ൌ ௫గ೒/௬ିሺଵି௫ሻλ௩ଵି௫ା௫/௬           (3.3) 
 
Before further extending our analysis, we briefly introduce a class of market 
evolution models pioneered by Farrell (1970).22 In general, when there are ݊ types 
of interacting market forces indexed by ݅ with market share ݖ௜ and utility ݑ௜ , the 
standard replicator dynamics (e.g., Hopkins 2002; Montgomery 2010) are given by: 
 
ݖ′
௜
ൌ ݖ௜ሺݑ௜ െ ∑ ݖ௝ݑ௝௡௝ୀଵ ሻ             (3.4) 
 
In these models, agents following behavioral strategies that offer utility greater 
                                                              
22 Evolutionary models first appeared in biology and were later introduced to economics. Our model in 
this section is similar to the example cited in Friedman (1991), p. 641, footnote 9. For a comprehensive 
treatment of evolutionary games, see, e.g., Samuelson (1998). 
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than the average utility gain market share, while the others lose share. While such 
models are clearly appropriate for the study of evolution, where utility means 
“surviving offspring,” they are also reasonable for economic situations where people 
adapt slowly to changing circumstances. Slow adaptation appears empirically relevant, 
and indeed might be rational in a larger game where either information or attention 
has limited availability (e.g., Lucas 1974). 
When there are only two actions, then ݖଵ ൌ 1 െ ݖଶ , and equation (3.4) 
devolves to ݖ′
ଵ
ൌ ݖଵሺ1 െ ݖଵሻሺݑଵ െ ݑଶሻ. Applied to our environment for the product 
quality model, we have two dynamic variables interacting with each other to 
constitute a system of differential equations. Based on (3.2) and (3.3), the two 
differential equations are: 
ݔ ′ ൌ ߙݔሺ1 െ ݔሻ ఋ௬ሺଵି௬ሻ௩ି௖
ଵିఋሺଵି௬ሻ
              (3.5) 
ݕ′ ൌ ߚݕሺ1 െ ݕሻ ௫గ೒ିሺଵି௫ሻఒ௩௬
௬ି௫௬ା௫
             (3.6) 
 
where ߙ and ߚ are parameters that permit us to vary the speed of adjustment; they 
correspond to a scaling of the utility of the buyers and sellers, respectively. There are 
two steady states in the interior of the unit square as shown in (3.7) and (3.8), in 
addition to (0, 0) and (1,1), which are also steady states. Their derivation is relegated 
to the appendix. 
ݔכ ൌ 1 െ
గ೒
భ
మቆଵേටଵି
ర೎
ഃೡቇఒ௩ାగ೒
            (3.7) 
ݕכ ൌ ଵ
ଶ
ቆ1 േ ට1 െ ସ௖
ఋ௩
ቇ              (3.8) 
Provided 1 ൐ ସ௖
ఋ௩
, there are three values of y consistent with a constant value 
of x, and moreover x is increasing only in the interval ቌ
ଵିටଵିర೎
ഃೡ
ଶ
,
ଵାටଵିర೎
ഃೡ
ଶ
ቍ. The 
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intuition is that if ݕ is large enough, there is no point in verifying, since few 
companies sell low quality products. On the other hand, if ݕ is small, it is too costly 
to verify since the expected cost of verifying is ܿ/ݕ. The steady state equilibrium 
defined above has two solutions, one with ݕכ ൐ 1/2 , and ݕכ ൏ 1/2. The lower 
value of ݕכ is unstable, while the high value is a stable spiral. 
Proposition 1: The higher value steady state in (3.7) and (3.8) is a stable spiral, 
when the following condition is satisfied: 
௖
௩
൏ ଵ
ସ
 ߜ െ ଵ
ସ
ߜሺ ଶିఋ
ଶା଼ఋഀഁିଶఋ
ሻଶ             (3.9) 
All proofs are in the Appendix. Of the three steady states shown in Figure 11, 
the steady state producing the highest utility is locally stable and is a spiral. Thus our 
product quality model demonstrates the trait of periodic convergence or cyclicality to 
a stable steady state under external shocks. 
 
Figure 11: Product Quality Model Phase Diagram 
The (0,0) steady state is also locally stable and is always a node. It cannot be cyclic 
for the simple reason that market shares cannot be negative. The lower interior steady 
state is a saddle. It is unstable in the sense that unless the shares line up on one of the 
20 
 
arms pointing inward, it cannot be reached, and these arms are a set of measure zero 
in the space of shares. Unlike common dynamic models where one of the variables is 
a price or shadow price that can make a discrete jump, both variables in the present 
model evolve via their equations of motion (3.5) and (3.6). Thus, in the present model, 
saddle stable solutions are very unlikely to be observed. 
Condition (3.9) can be compared to our original assumption that guarantees 
interior steady states, ୡ
୴
൏ ଵ
ସ
 δ . First consider the case of no speedup where 
ߙ ൌ ߚ ൌ 1. In that case, (3.9) becomes ௖
௩
൏ ଵ
ସ
 ߜ െ ଵ
ସ
ߜሺ ଶିఋ
ଶା଺ఋ
ሻଶ. Note that the second 
term on the right hand side of this condition is always positive, so that the condition is 
satisfied for small values of ܿ/ݒ. Moreover, in a sense (3.9) is not “much” stronger in 
realistic settings, as it reduces the original upper bound of 1/4ߜ by ሺ2 െ ߜሻଶ/ሺ2 ൅
6ߜሻ2. This translates into a ܿ/ݒ upper bound reduction of less than 5% for ߜ above 
2/3. Condition (3.9) is easier to satisfy as customers react more rapidly, and harder to 
satisfy as the scammers react more rapidly. 
4. A General Model 
In this section, we extend the example of the previous section to a more general theory. 
We use financial securities fraud for illustrative purposes but as will be clear, the 
theory itself is quite flexible. Suppose there are two types of brokerage firms in an 
economy: law-abiding companies selling legitimate financial products and 
low-quality companies that purvey scam investments. Scams can range from 
fraudulent to legal but with unreasonably high transaction fees. Let the demand side 
be characterized by a percentage of the population that is vigilant, denoted by ݔሺݐሻ, 
where t is time. Demand for scams, i.e., the percentage of the population susceptible 
to scams, is 1 െ ݔሺݐሻ . By vigilant, we mean that those customers check the 
company’s background, verify its marketing literature, and take other due diligence 
efforts. Vigilance is costly. Let ݕሺݐሻ denote the percentage of high-quality companies 
in the market at time ݐ. Equivalently one can think of 1 െ ݕሺݐሻ as the probability 
21 
 
that a customer encounters a low-quality company. 
Under a dynamic framework, ݔሺݐሻ and ݕሺݐሻ certainly interact with each 
other. An increase in the probability of encountering low-quality companies is likely 
to increase the percentage of the population who are vigilant. Likewise, the more 
vigilant people are, the less profitable it is for companies to purvey scams. The 
interaction between ݔሺݐሻ and ݕሺݐሻ in a dynamic market can be modeled by the 
following system of differential equations: 
 
ቐ 
ݔ ′ሺݐሻ ൌ ߙ݂ሺݔሺݐሻ, ݕሺݐሻሻ
ݕ′ሺݐሻ ൌ ߚ݃ሺݔሺݐሻ, ݕሺݐሻሻ
             (4.1) 
 
This model is general enough to cover a variety of fraud situations. As before, 
ߙ and ߚ are parameters to vary the speed of adjustment. When 1 െ ݕሺݐሻ represents 
the percentage of corporate executives who misrepresent financial information, ݔሺݐሻ 
can represent the percentage of vigilant investors. In this case, we have a model of 
corporate financial misrepresentation. Such misrepresentation may be legal, where 
firms mislead rather than lie. When 1 െ ݕሺݐሻ represents the percentage of investment 
firms who plot Ponzi schemes, ݔሺݐሻ can describe the percentage of investors who are 
not easily swindled. This model applies to the recent boom in Ponzi schemes led by 
Bernie Madoff. The variables ݔሺݐሻ and 1 െ ݕሺݐሻ also can denote the percentage of 
government auditors and corrupt officials, respectively, in which case we have a 
model to study corruption. In fact, as long as ݔሺݐሻ and ݕሺݐሻ are interacting forces in 
a market whose evolution is described by a pair of ordinary differential equations, this 
model can be used to study its equilibrium properties. 
We are interested first in stable behavior, and second when such behavior is a 
spiral, in which case the convergence path displays a cyclical pattern. Mathematically 
both stability and cyclicality are determined by the trace and determinant of the 
Jacobian matrix of the system of differential equations (Luenberger, 1979). 
In most differential equation models with two variables found in economics, 
22 
 
one variable is a state variable (e.g., capital) and the other a co-state variable (e.g., 
price). In such models, the co-state variable generally adjusts instantly, so solutions 
involve saddle paths, with the co-state variable jumping instantly to be on the path, 
while the state variable adjusts smoothly. In contrast, both of the relevant variables in 
our analysis are state variables, so saddle-stability is unstable, as there is a 
measure-zero set of starting points leading to the steady state. 
Let xכ and yכ be a steady state, meaning that they satisfy the following:23 
 
൜ 
0 ൌ ݂ሺݔכ, ݕכሻ
0 ൌ ݃ሺݔכ, ݕכ ሻ
               (4.2) 
Applying Taylor’s expansion around (4.2) above and ignoring higher order terms, (4.1) 
can be linearized as: 
 
൞ 
ݔ ′ ൎ ߙ డ௙ሺ௫
כ,௬כሻ
డ௫
ሺݔ െ ݔכሻ ൅ ߙ డ௙
ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௬
ሺݕ െ ݕכሻ
ݕ′ ൎ ߚ డ௚ሺ௫
כ,௬כሻ
డ௫
ሺݔ െ ݔכሻ ൅ ߚ డ௚
ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௬
ሺݕ െ ݕכሻ
        (4.3) 
 
To shorten notation, let ௫݂ ൌ
డ௙ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௫
, ௬݂ ൌ
డ௙ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௬
, ݃௫ ൌ
డ௚ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௫
, and ݃௬ ൌ
డ௚ሺ௫כ,௬כሻ
డ௬
. In matrix format, the above system can be rewritten as: 
 
቎
ݔ′
ݕ′
቏ ൎ ܣ ൤
ݔ െ ݔכ
ݕ െ ݕכ൨, where ܣ ൌ ൤
ߙ ௫݂ ߙ ௬݂
ߚ݃௫ ߚ݃௬
൨        (4.3)’ 
We use the following lemma, found, e.g., in Luenberger (1979), to describe the steady 
state nature and its convergence patterns. 
Lemma 2: A steady state to (4.1) is strictly stable if ܶݎሺܣሻ ൏ 0  and 
݀݁ݐ ሺܣሻ ൒ 0. Furthermore, a stable steady state is locally a stable spiral if ܶݎሺܣሻଶ ൏
4݀݁ݐ ሺܣሻ, and a sink ܶݎሺܣሻଶ ൐ 4݀݁ݐ ሺܣሻ. 
Looking at the model in (4.1), it is easy to see that a speedup or slowdown of 
                                                              
23 We suppress the notation for the time variable t for simplicity, whenever the practice does not cause 
confusion. 
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the system, changing (ߙ, ߚሻ, will not change the steady states and their stability 
conditions, as stated in Proposition 3 below. This means that changes in media 
technology, which might make either side react faster, will only have short-term 
effects. Such effects are unlikely to change the stability of the steady states, which 
consist of equilibrium fractions of low-quality companies and vigilant consumers, 
although paths to the steady states would of course change. 
Proposition 3: The set of steady states and the stability of those states are 
invariant to the speed up parameters (ߙ, ߚሻ. 
When are stable steady states spirals? If the off-diagonal elements have the 
same sign, a spiral is impossible. In contrast, if the off-diagonal elements have 
opposite signs, then spirals exist for intermediate levels of ߚ/ߙ. This most important 
result of our general model is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: Under (4.3)’ where ݀݁ݐ ሺܣሻ ് 0 and ݃௬ ് 0, a stable steady 
state is always a sink, if ௬݂݃௫ ൐ 0. If ௬݂݃௫ ൏ 0, there exists an interval in ߚ/ߙ for 
which a stable steady state is a spiral. The interval is bounded away from 0 and ∞. 
Proposition 4 implies that if ߙ and ߚ are too different when ௬݂݃௫ ൏ 0, in 
other words if one type of agent reacts rapidly and the other slowly, then the steady 
state would be a sink. When they are within intermediate ranges, a spiral results. 
Proposition 4 also implies the following corollary, which confirms proposition 1 for 
the example in the previous section in a generalized fashion. 
Corollary 5: When ௫݂݃௬ ൌ 0, there exists an interval in ߚ/ߙ for which a 
stable steady state is a spiral. 
The critical condition for a spiral, ௬݂݃௫ ൏ 0, is met if ௬݂ ൏ 0 and ݃௫ ൐ 0. 
Going back to the definition of these terms, ௬݂ ൏ 0 if an increase in the number of 
high-quality companies will reduce the rate of increase of being vigilant and verifying, 
while ݃௫ ൐ 0 requires that an increase in being vigilant and verifying will increase 
the rate of growth of high-quality companies. Both of these are reasonable conditions 
suggested by the class of problems motivating the analysis. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
We reviewed historic data on frauds and identified empirical evidence of peak and 
trough patterns associated with some common frauds. The data suggest that frauds 
tend to follow a cyclical path. We proposed a new theory to show that cyclicality 
follows inherently from interacting market forces to (1) shun and eliminate frauds on 
the demand side and (2) sustain and perpetuate frauds on the supply side. The 
strategic interaction between the demand and supply forces of fraud causes the 
cyclical path to equilibrium to be robust to outside shocks, such as government 
intervention. We identify conditions under which such cyclical behavior occurs. 
Fundamentally, cyclicality is caused by market players’ non-reinforcing 
responses to external shocks under stable dynamic systems. As scammers become 
more successful, customers react by increased wariness, reducing the pay to 
scamming. This cyclicality is substantially different than the supply and demand hog 
cycle, which was predicated on delayed reactions—hog ranchers increasing the stock 
in reaction to today’s prices, which results in an increase in supply next season. In 
contrast, the cyclicality discovered in this paper is a consequence of endogenous delay, 
driven off the evolutionary dynamics. The present theory is general enough to 
investigate a variety of frauds. The characterization of local behavior greatly 
simplifies the understanding of system equilibrium behavior without actually solving 
for the solutions, which can be immensely complicated even under a simple 
specification like the example provided in Section 3. 
Future research effort points to two directions. One is to empirically study 
more types of frauds to further evaluate the hypothesis of cyclical behavior. Unlike 
business cycles, for which data are collected systematically by macroeconomics 
policy authorities and other economics research institutions, fraud cycles are more 
subtle to discern due to their fundamentally illegal nature. Observation tends to reduce 
fraud through increased awareness. On the theoretical side, our model primarily 
focuses on the spiral steady state that results in cyclical behavior. A natural extension 
is the case of swindlers choosing from a set of potential frauds. 
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Appendix 
DERIVATION OF THE STEADY STATES: 
First note from (3.5) that ݔ ′ ൌ 0 arises when ݕଶ െ ݕ ൅ ܿ/ߜݒ ൌ 0, which if it 
has a solution in [0,1], it has two generically. These solutions are ݕכ ൌ ሺ1 േ
ඥ1 െ 4ܿ/ߜݒሻ/2. By (3.6), the steady states in ݕ arise when ݔߨ௚/ݕ െ ሺ1 െ ݔሻߣݒ ൌ
0, or ݔכ ൌ ߣݒ/ሺߣݒ ൅ ߨ௚/ݕכሻ. Plug in the solution for ݕכ to yield the two steady, 
nonzero states for (ݔכ, ݕכ). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
We first linearize the system by first order approximation around the steady 
state: 
቎
ݔ′
ݕ′
቏ ൎ ቂ
ܽଵଵ ܽଵଶ
ܽଶଵ ܽଶଶ
ቃ ൤
ݔ െ ݔכ
ݕ െ ݕכ൨ 
 
 ൌ ቎
ߙሺ1 െ 2ݔכሻ ఋ௬
כሺଵି௬כሻ௩ି௖
ଵିఋሺଵି௬כሻ
ߙݔכሺ1 െ ݔכሻ ఋሺଵିଶ௬
כሻ௩
ଵିఋሺଵି௬כሻ
ߚݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
గ೒/௬כାఒ௩
ଵି௫כା௫כ/௬כ
ߚݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻ ିሺଵି௫
כሻఒ௩/௬כ
ଵି௫כା௫כ/௬כ
቏ ൤
ݔ െ ݔכ
ݕ െ ݕכ൨    (A.1) 
 
Note that ܽଵଵ ൌ 0, because ߜݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻݒ െ ܿ ൌ 0. It is obvious that every 
product term in ܽଶଵ is positive such that ܽଶଵ ൐ 0. The same can be said about ܽଶଶ 
other than that െሺ1 െ ݔכሻߣݒ/ݕכ in ܽଶଶ  is negative. Therefore, ܽଶଶ ൏ 0. Finally 
ܽଵଶ ൏ 0 , since 1 െ 2ݕכ ൏ 0  as ݕכ  of our interest is of the higher value, and 
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ݕכሻ ൐ 0. Then the stability result follows Lemma 2. 
To have a steady state be a spiral, one needs the condition  ܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ
4 detሺܣሻ ൏ 0.  
ܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ 4 detሺܣሻ 
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ൌ ሾߚݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
െሺ1 െ ݔכሻߣݒ/ݕכ
1 െ ݔכ ൅ ݔכ/ݕכ
ሿଶ
൅ 4ߙߚݔכሺ1 െ ݔכሻݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻ ቈ
ߜሺ1 െ 2ݕכሻݒ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
቉ ሾ
ߨ௚
ݕכ ൅ ߣݒ
1 െ ݔכ ൅ ݔ
כ
ݕכ
ሿ 
ൌ
ߚሺ1 െ ݔכሻ ݕכሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
1 െ ݔכ ൅ ݔכ/ݕכ
ቊ
ߚሺ1 െ ݔכሻ ሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
ݕכሺ1 െ ݔכሻ ൅ ݔכ
ሺߣݒሻଶ ൅ 4ߙݔכ
ߜሺ1 െ 2ݕכሻݒ
1 െ ߜሺ1 െ ݕכሻ
ሺߣݒ/ݔכሻቋ 
 
ൌ ሺߚߣݒଶሻ
ሺଵି௫כሻ ௬כሺଵି௬כሻ
ଵି௫כା௫כ/௬כ
൜ ఉ 
ሺଵି௬כሻఒ
௬כ൫ଵାఒ௩/గ೒൯
൅ 4 ఈఋ
ሺଵିଶ௬כሻ 
ଵିఋሺଵି௬כሻ
 ൠ       (A.1) 
 
The above steps use the steady state condition ݔכߨ௚ െ ሺ1 െ ݔכሻߣݒݕכ ൌ 0. For 
(A.1) to be negative, it suffices to show the third term in (A.1), what is in the large 
parenthesis, to be negative, since all the product terms in the front are all positive. For 
convenience denote ߠ ൌ ට1 െ ସ௖
ఋ௩
 such that the high value steady state ݕכ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ
ሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ, and plug it into the last part of (A.1). We then need to show the following: 
 
ఉ ሺଵି௬כሻఒ
௬כ൫ଵାఒ௩/గ೒൯
൅ 4 ఈఋ
ሺଵିଶ௬כሻ 
ଵିఋሺଵି௬כሻ
ൌ ఉ
ሺଵିఏሻఒ 
ሺଵାఏሻሺଵାఒ௩/గ೒ሻ
െ ଼ఈఋ ఏ
ଶିఋሺଵିఏሻ
൏ 0       
 
After arranging terms, we have  
2ߚሺ1 െ ߠሻߣ െ ߚߜሺ1 െ ߠሻଶߣ െ 8ߙߜߠሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ ൬1 ൅ ఒ௩
గ೒
൰ ൏ 0      (A.2) 
Note that (A.2) does not always hold, for example when ߠ ՜ 0. But since 1 ൅ ఒ௩
గ೒
൐
ߣ, a sufficient condition for (A.2) is 2ߚሺ1 െ ߠሻ െ ߚߜሺ1 െ ߠሻଶ െ 8ߙߜߠሺ1 ൅ ߠሻ ൏ 0. 
Or,  
ߜሺ8ߙ ൅ ߚሻ ߠଶ ൅ ሺ2ߚ ൅ 8ߙߜ െ 2ߚߜሻߠ ൅ ߚሺߜ െ 2ሻ ൐ 0       (A.3) 
Since the first term of (A.3) is always positive, we just look at a sufficient condition: 
ሺ2ߚ ൅ 8ߙߜ െ 2ߚߜሻߠ ൅ ߚሺߜ െ 2ሻ ൐ 0         (A.4) 
Plugging the definition of ߠ and solving for ܿ/ݒ, it can be shown that (A.4) is 
satisfied under (3.9).              QED. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
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Let Tr(A) denote the trace of matrix A, ߙ ௫݂ ൅ ߚ݃௬, and let det(A) denote its 
determinant, ߙ ௫݂ߚ݃௬ െ ߙ ௬݂ߚ݃௫ . Eigenvalues of matrix A, ߣ , solving ߣଶ െ
൫ߙ ௫݂ ൅ ߚ݃௬൯ߣ ൅ ሺߙ ௫݂ߚ݃௬ െ ߙ ௬݂ߚ݃௫ሻ ൌ 0, yields 
ߣ ൌ ଵ
ଶ
ሾሺߙ ௫݂ ൅ ߚ݃௬ሻ േ ට൫ߙ ௫݂ െ ߚ݃௬൯
ଶ
൅ 4ߙ ௬݂ߚ݃௫ሿ , which can be rearranged as 
ߣ ൌ ଵ
ଶ
ሾܶݎሺܣሻ േ ඥܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ 4݀݁ݐ ሺܣሻሿ. Then the behavior of the steady state depends 
on the sign of ܶݎሺܣሻ and whether the square root of the term in the parenthesis is a 
real or complex number. This leads to Lemma 2, which is a standard result in systems 
of linear differential equations (e.g., Luenberger 1979).       QED. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
The steady state condition is obvious by the definition of ሺݔכ, ݕכሻ in (4.2). 
The stability condition is also straightforward by noting that in the matrix ܣ ൌ
൤
ߙ ௫݂ ߙ ௬݂
ߚ݃௫ ߚ݃௬
൨ of (4.3)’, ܶݎሺܣሻ ൌ ߙ ௫݂ ൅ ߚ݃௬ ൐ 0 when ௫݂ ൅ ݃௬ ൐ 0 and ߙ, ߚ ൐ 0. 
Its determinant is also positive, since detሺܣሻ ൌ ߙߚ൫ ௫݂݃௬ െ ௬݂݃௫൯ ൒ 0  when 
௫݂݃௬ െ ௬݂݃௫ ൒ 0 and ߙ, ߚ ൐ 0.           QED. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:  
The sign of ܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ 4 ݀݁ݐሺܣሻ ൌ ൫ߙ ௫݂ െ ߚ݃௬൯
ଶ
൅ 4ߙߚ ௬݂݃௫ is the same as 
the sign of ൫ ௫݂ െ ߛ݃௬൯
ଶ
൅ 4ߛ ௬݂݃௫ where ߛ ൌ ߚ/ߙ. The sign of the latter can be 
examined by looking at its minimum, since it is convex in ߛ.  Solving for ߛ 
minimum’s first order condition yields ߛכ ൌ ௙ೣ
௚೤
െ
ଶఈఉ௙೤௚ೣ
௚೤మ
. Plugging this solution 
back to the objective function gives:   
min ܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ 4 ݀݁ݐሺܣሻ ൌ 4 ൬
ఈ௙೤ఉ௚ೣ
௚೤మ
൰ ሺߙ ௫݂ߚ݃௬ െ ߙ ௬݂ߚ݃௫ሻ
 
      (A.5) 
 
Now ݃௬ଶ ൐ 0 and ߙ ௫݂ߚ݃௬ െ ߙ ௬݂ߚ݃௫ ൐ 0 by the stability condition. Thus the sign 
of ܶݎሺܣሻଶ െ 4 ݀݁ݐሺܣሻ is determined by the sign of ௬݂݃௫ when ߙ, ߚ ൐ 0. QED. 
 
